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INTRODUCTION

In North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down the State
of North Carolina's omnibus voting law passed in 2013. The court held that
the law violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S.
2
Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In reversing
the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina upholding the omnibus voting law, 3 this panel held that
North Carolina's election changes were passed with a discriminatory effect.4
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit held that North Carolina's electoral changes
were passed with an intent to abridge the ability for African Americans to
vote.5 While as of this writing, North Carolina has filed a petition for

Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. The author would like
to thank Elizabeth Stryker for research assistance with this Article. The author would also like
to acknowledge the support of Dean Gregory W. Bowman and the West Virginia University
College of Law for financial support of this research via the Arthur B. Hodges Summer
Research Grant. Feedback and comments on this Article are welcome at
atiba.ellis@mail.wvu.edu.
1.
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016).
2.
Id. at 219.
3.
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 423
(M.D.N.C. 2016).
4.
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 229.
5.
Id. at 225.
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certiorari from the United States Supreme Court to review the Fourth
Circuit's opinion,6 the ruling in this case represents a landmark victory for
voting rights advocates against strict voter identification laws and other
similar regulations that foster voter suppression in the political process. It
also represents a remarkable and extraordinary use of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments specifically to find discriminatory intent on the basis
of race.
These issues, however, remain contentious across the country. The
Fourth Circuit's ruling stands in contrast with rulings from other
jurisdictions that have, on similar evidence, tended to find evidence of
intention less than fully persuasive and thus constitutional penalties did not
accrue.7 The Fourth Circuit's ruling stands out as an effort for a three-judge
court, in the face of a shifting political scene as well as a changing legal and
jurisprudential landscape, to articulate a standard for understanding where
political manipulation translates into racial discrimination-a standard
described in this Article as required due care in the analysis of race. This
Article begins, in Part II, with a description of the background to this case.
Then in Part III, this Article will examine the McCrory decision with an eye
towards parsing out how the court arrived at this due care approach. Part IV
then confronts the uncertain future of McCrory in light of its possible review
by the Supreme Court, the uncertain present around the Voting Rights Act,
and the disfavored academic and judicial literature around race-conscious
remedies. In particular, it will compare McCrory with Abbot, the Fifth
Circuit's fractured opinion considering claims of disparate impact and
intentional discrimination in Texas's voter identification law, another voter
qualification regulation passed in the wake of Shelby County v. Holder.8
This Article concludes optimistically by noting that whether McCrory
represents a momentary victory in the larger attack against the Voting Rights
Act or whether it stands as good law for the foreseeable future, the opinion
offers a well-reasoned approach that accomplishes the ends of the Voting
Rights Act through offering a race-conscious intersectional approach
grounded in the reality of voter suppression in North Carolina. And it is to
that history that this Article now turns.

6. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016), arguedDec. 5, 2016.
7.
In particular, as will be discussed in this Article, the Fifth Circuit, in considering the
recently passed voter identification law in Texas, found that the regulation had a disparate
racial impact but fractured on whether the voter ID law had been passed with an intent to
abridge the right to vote on the basis of race. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.
2016).
8.
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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BACKGROUND OF McCRORY CASE

In 2010, the Republican Party came to dominate North Carolina's state
legislature.9 Shortly thereafter, in 2012, Pat McCrory, a Republican, was
elected governor of North Carolina thus unifying legislative and executive
control of the legislature under one political party.' 0 This Republican
legislature sought to implement a number of legislative priorities that it felt
had been neglected under the prior period of political control divided
between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.
One of the Republican Party's political priorities was the institution of
voter identification laws and limitation of voter inclusiveness laws that were
designed to foster further participation in the electoral process." The
Republican legislature sought to implement these more "strict" voter
participation laws to enhance election integrity and to enhance their
*12
opportunities to win elections.
Yet these goals did not stand in isolation. North Carolina's efforts to
transform voting regulations must be read against the history of the state
regarding race and politics. From the passage of the Voting Rights Act in
1965 to 2013, North Carolina (or portions of the state) had to negotiate with
the federal government concerning its voting laws prior to implementing
them. 13 This had the effect of allowing the federal government to shape the
direction of any change in voting. The leverage that the federal government
had in order to negotiate these laws was based on Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Congress determined that Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act required that certain jurisdictions, which had a history of discriminating
on the basis of race when it comes to political participation and had a
continuing disparate impact regarding race when it comes to actual

9.
GOP Takes Control of State Legislature, WRALCOM (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/8556651/.
10. North CarolinaElection Results 2012: McCrory Wins Governor's Race; Hudson
Tops Kissell for House Seat; Romney Gets Narrow Victory, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision20l2/north-carolina-election-results-2012mccrory-wins-govemors-race-hudson-tops-kissell-for-house-seat-ronney-gets-narrowvictory/2012/11/07/201e8cle-23a8-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24 story.html?utm term=.72d8274
38331.
11. Aaron Blake, North CarolinaGovernorSigns Extensive Voter ID Law, WASH. POST
(Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/08/12/northcarolina-governor-signs-extensive-voter-id-law/?utm term=.ef4al09b1cf4.
12. Id
13. See Richard L. Hasen, This is Why the Voting Rights Act is on Trial in North
31,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
Carolina,
WASH.
POST
(July
news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/31/this-is-why-the-voting-rights-act-is-on-trial-in-northcarolina/?utm term=.4023b5804c41.
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participation in the political process, had to have their voting rights laws
subjected to approval by the United States Department of Justice.1 4 During
the most immediate time Section 5 preclearance was in effect, as the Fourth
Circuit observed, "African-American voter registration swelled by 51.1%
(compared to an increase of 15.8% for white voters). African-American
turnout similarly surged, from 41.9% in 2000 to 71.5% in 2008 and 68.5%
in 2012."
As a result, North Carolina, like many other states including Texas and
16
Virginia and a number of other jurisdictions across the country, had to
negotiate with the Department of Justice in order to get pre-clearance or preapproval regarding any voting rights change that would have an effect on
minority citizens. Within this context, North Carolina, like South Carolina
and other jurisdictions at the time, negotiated with the Department in order
to implement a voter identification regime and other voter participation rules
changes in line with the political interest of the Republican Party but, at the
same time, to avoid claims of racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder17
changed all of this. In Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck down
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act." Section 4(b) contained the formula
by which the federal government determined which jurisdictions in the
United States would be considered covered jurisdictions and as a result
would have to be subjected to pre-clearance.1 9 The opinion of Chief Justice
John Roberts for the Shelby County majority found that Congress, in
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act, had not taken into account changes in
the rates of participation in voting in the South nor had Congress taken into
account the concept of equal sovereignty among the states when it came to
the federal government's power to regulate areas that were traditionally
considered provinces of state authority.20 On this basis, the Court struck

14.
15.

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013).
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 215. It is also worth noting that in 2008 and 2012, Barack

Obama, the first candidate for the presidency of African descent, was running for office. His
candidacy led to tremendous African American turnout. It was precisely this turnout that
created significant opportunities for the Democrats to be competitive in close jurisdictions. See
Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of

Democracy, 86 DENV. L. REv. 1023, 1023 n.2 (2009). This is certainly true for North
Carolina, which has, over the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, emerged as a
quintessential swing state in presidential elections.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013).
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012), transferredto 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012).
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24.
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down Section 4(b), which had the effect of leaving the Section 5
preclearance regime inoperative while leaving open the opportunity for
Congress to pass a new Section 4(b) that took into account the changes in
21
political culture on which the Court relied.
In the wake of Shelby County, North Carolina no longer needed to
preclear its election regulation changes. Indeed, the state took the
opportunity to pass voting regulations that fully comported to their particular
22
political ends. Accordingly, during a special session in July and August of
2013, North Carolina reconsidered all of the political measures that it
deemed necessary to pass and focused on establishing a "strict" voter
identification provision, limiting same-day voting registration, limiting early
voting opportunities, eliminating Sunday voter registration opportunities,
23
and other provisions.
In reaching this decision, the legislature specifically "requested and
received racial data as to usages of the practices changed by the proposed
law." 24 The data the legislature received showed that African Americans
disproportionately did not possess the voter identification credentials that
would be required under its act, that African Americans disproportionately
used early voting in both 2008 and 2012, and that African Americans
disproportionately used the first seven days of early voting.25 The data also
showed that African Americans disproportionately used same-day
26
registration and provisional voting. Further, the legislature had data that
showed that African Americans disproportionately used preregistration (the
practice of allowing sixteen and seventeen-year-olds to register to vote prior
to turning eighteen, so long as they would be eligible to vote by the next
election.)27

The Fourth Circuit observed that after receipt of this data, the legislature
eliminated or restricted all of these voting practices so that they impacted
African-American preferences.28 Thus, at the end of this session, the

21. Id at 2631.
22. The Fourth Circuit pointed to a statement by the Republican Chairman of the North
Carolina Senate Rules committee issued the day after the Shelby County decision: "I think
we'll have an omnibus bill coming out" and that the Senate would pass the "full bill." N.C.
State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 339 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
23. See Q&A: Changes to NC Election Laws, WRAL.CoM (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.wral.com/election-changes-coming-in-2014-2016/12750290/.
24. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir.
2016).
25. Id
26. Id.
27. Id at 217-18.
28. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court had observed the following:
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legislature, over objections from Democrats and civil rights groups, passed
new rules regarding election regulations.29 These rules included passage of a
voter identification provision limiting same-day registration opportunities,
limiting early voting opportunities, and other related provisions. 0 The
General Assembly passed those rules to take effect during the 2014 election
cycle. Yet, civil rights groups sued and obtained a stay of several of those
regulations. 3' The district court denied the stay, but the Fourth Circuit order
stayed the elimination of the same-day registration and out-of-precinct
32
voting changes.
The Supreme Court lifted the Fourth Circuit's stay
pending its decision on certiorari, but then denied certiorari, which then
33
reinstituted the Fourth Circuit's stay. The other rules from the omnibus
voting law were implemented in 2014.
This underlying lawsuit nonetheless proceeded and, at trial, the State of
North Carolina defended the omnibus voting bill against claims made by the
NAACP and other civil rights groups that these rules had a disparate effect
35
on the basis of race. The state ultimately argued that the voting laws were
neutral and reasonable and necessary to protect election integrity.36 The state
also argued that the laws were not intended to disenfranchise on the basis of
37
race.

The district court found that not only did [the omnibus voting law]
eliminate or restrict these voting mechanisms used disproportionately
by African Americans, and require IDs that African Americans
disproportionately lacked, but also that African Americans were more
likely to "experience socioeconomic factors that may hinder their
political participation." This is so, the district court explained, because
in North Carolina, African Americans are "disproportionately likely to
move, be poor, less educated, have less access to transportation, and
experience poor health." Id. at 218.
29. See H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013); 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381. SL
2013-381 "eliminated one of two 'souls-to-the-polls' Sundays in which African American
churches provided transportation to voters. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 217. SL 2013-381 eliminated
same-day voter registration, and the bill "retained only the kind of IDs that white North
Carolinians were more likely to possess." Id. at 216.
30. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381.
31. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248-49 (4th Cir.
2014).
32. Jd. at 238.
33. Id.
34. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (Mem.).
35. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 331
(M.D.N.C. 2016).
36. Id. at 459.
37. Id.
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However, in advance of the trial, the state ratified House Bill 836.38 This
law amended the photo ID by providing a reasonable impediment exception
to the photo ID requirement.3 A voter could under this provision cast a
provisional ballot if she filed a written declaration stating that she had "a
reasonable impediment that prevents the voter from obtaining photo
identification." 40 In light of this, the district court bifurcated the trial so that
all the other provisions of the omnibus voting law were tried first, and then a
separate trial took place regarding the photo ID requirement.
After the bifurcated trial, the district court agreed with the state's
provisions and upheld the omnibus voting law.4 ' In agreeing with the state's
position, the trial court wrote an in-depth opinion of over one-hundred pages
which went item by item and ultimately justified each individual voting
42
change provision. The district court found no discriminatory results under
Section 2, no discriminatory intent under either Section 2, the Fourteenth
Amendment, or the Fifteenth Amendment, and no violation of the TwentySixth Amendment.43 Consequently, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.44
III.

THE McCRORYDECISION AND THE DUE CARE APPROACH

On appeal before the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs renewed their
arguments that the laws were passed with discriminatory intent and had a
discriminatory effect. 45 A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit heard these
claims and agreed with the plaintiffs that the North Carolina omnibus voting
bill had been passed with discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46
In short, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court was myopic
in its analysis.47 The opinion, which was unanimous in all respects except
the scope of the prospective remedy, was authored by Judge Diana Gribbon
Motz. 48 The opinion opens by criticizing the methodology of the district

38.
39.
40.
41.
2016).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

H.B. 836, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015).
Id.
Id.
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir.
Id
Id.
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219.
Id
Id. at 235.
Id at 214.
Id
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court in as much as the district court "missed the forest in carefully
surveying the many trees." 49 In other words, the Fourth Circuit criticized the
district court's methodology of examining each particular legal change in
isolation and thus finding that the vast majority of the individual rules
passed had a neutral, rational basis and therefore ought to be considered
legal. 50 The Fourth Circuit opined that the district court had ultimately
ignored the import of the underlying totality of the circumstances analysis
required under the Voting Rights Act.
The Fourth Circuit ultimately found that the district court's narrowsighted approach to analyzing the North Carolina omnibus voting bill
ignored the overall total impact that the laws had in terms of their ability to
dissuade African-American voters from voting.52 The district court ignored
the true totality of the circumstances by focusing on the proffered reasons
for the changes in law without actually exploring the overall atmosphere in
which the laws were created and thus leaving out the circumstantial evidence
* *
53
of discriminatory animus regarding these provisions. In particular, the
Fourth Circuit's opinion articulated a legal standard in terms of assessing the
totality of circumstances regarding impact under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.54
In reaching this conclusion, the panel framed the legal principle as a
question of understanding intentional racial discrimination within the
context of legislative decision-making regarding the law governing
politics. 5 5 The court began with an explication of the test for discriminatory

intent set forth in in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
56
Development Corp. The panel explained that this test examines the

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 233.
52. Id.
53. Id. See also id at 215 ("Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution prohibit racial discrimination in the regulation of elections, state
legislatures have too often found facially race-neutral ways to deny African Americans access
to the franchise.").
54. Id. The Fourth Circuit stressed that "any individual piece of evidence can seem
innocuous when viewed alone, but gains an entirely different meaning when considered in
context," thus finding that a totality of the circumstances approach, as required by Arlington
Heights, is necessary to uncover discriminatory racial intent. Id. at 233.
55. Id.at234-35.
56. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). This "sensitive inquiry" test includes "the historical
background of the [challenged] decision"; "the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision"; "[d]epartures from normal procedural sequence"; "the legislative history
of the decision"; and the disproportionate "impact of the official action, whether it bears more

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/2
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circumstantial evidence around a decision to determine whether a
discriminatory purpose was "a motivating factor," or a "because of' factor in
making the decision. To analyze this, the court correctly noted that this
inquiry must necessarily be circumstantial since explicit evidence regarding
the decision would be difficult to find. Moreover, the court noted that this
circumstantial evaluation is particularly pertinent to vote denial cases, in as
much as "discrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used
in 1965 ."59 Further, in acknowledging that the circumstantial evidence may
be rebutted by a demonstration by the government that the nondiscriminatory purposes alone justify the law, the court noted its role as not
60
to be deferential to the views of the legislators.
While this serves to frame the Arlington Heights analysis generally, the
most controversial part of the court's framing of these issues is its reliance
on racially polarized voting doctrine to explain incentives for racial
discrimination. The court reasoned that racial polarization in voting-that is,
the strong correlation between the race of a group of voters and a strong
preference for a particular candidate both exists in North Carolina and thus
61
provides incentives for legislators to discriminate on the basis of race. In
other words, the "political cohesiveness of the minority groups . . . provides

the political payoff for legislators who seek to dilute or limit the minority
vote."62 In other words, politicians who see a racially polarized electorate
may be motivated to target that particular minority group in ways that
diminish their voting power so that the group may entrench itself through
63
discriminatory election laws.

heavily on one race than another." McCrory, 831 F.3d at 220-21 (quoting Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 266-67).
57. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 220.
58. This circumstantial evidence test includes an inquiry into the following factors: the
historical background to the decision, the sequence of events related to the decision, departures
from normal procedural sequence, the legislative history of the decision, and the
disproportionate impact of the official action with particular regard as to whether it weighs
more heavily on one race or another. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 226-27.
59. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 221.
60. Id. at 226-27.
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id. at 222.
63. This theory necessarily relies on vote dilution cases to establish its history. In
particular, the Fourth Circuit relied on LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), for this analysis
to demonstrate that such discrimination may take place. In effect, this opinion extends the
theory to the vote denial realm through reasoning that such behavior by legislatures is
impermissible as it constitutes an intentional targeting on the basis of race. McCrory, 831 F.3d
at 222-23 (reasoning that racially polarized voting may motivate politicians impermissibly
applies to the vote denial context because "legislatures cannot restrict voting access on the
basis of race. (Nor, we note, can legislatures restrict access to the franchise based on the desire
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Indeed, the Fourth Circuit goes so far as to observe: "Using race as a
proxy for party may be an effective way to win an election. But intentionally
targeting a particular race's access to the franchise because its members vote
for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory
purpose."64
In making this examination under Arlington Heights, as modified by the
racial polarization principle, the Fourth Circuit made an effort to understand
the legislative direction and the facts and circumstances around the
65
legislature's actions. It also added the context of North Carolina's history
and the present statements that could have been read as animus regarding the
ability for black voters in North Carolina to participate in the political
66
process. In particular, the Fourth Circuit recognized that race and politics
were inextricably linked and that both conventional wisdom and data
regarding voting patterns in North Carolina demonstrated that racial bloc
voting continues to be a particular phenomenon in North Carolina's electoral
process. 68
This historical and modem day framing of North Carolina's status as a
racially polarized electorate framed the Arlington Heights analysis for the
Fourth Circuit. It went to great lengths to criticize the district court for
failing to reconcile the history of racial discrimination with the evidence of
racial impact and the claims of discriminatory intent.69 This was a recurring
theme. It examined the former of these issues through exploring in detail
North Carolina's history regarding racial discrimination under its Section 5
experience and pending lawsuits regarding racial gerrymandering.70
The panel then examined the latter issue through a detailed parsing of
the history of the passage of the omnibus voting regulations bill.7 It noted
that the effort to pass the bill took place almost immediately after the
decision in Shelby County, suggesting a discriminatory motivation to pass
72
the law. The court then emphasized that the bill was considered in special
session and that the rules and practices which took place during the special
session deviated from the basic practices of the legislature in such a way as

to benefit
(1983)).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

a certain political party.)") (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792-93
McCrory, 831 F.3d at 222.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 229-30.

69. Id. at 214.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 214-19.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 229.
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one could read the context as a decision being made in a fly by night
manner.73 While there were no particular rule changes, the deviations from
the rules were deemed to be extraordinary in terms of the procedures used to
pass these laws and that the ultimate presentment and approval of these laws
by the governor took place in such a way that it raised the concern whether
there was adequate debate around these laws or adequate knowledge by the
public in order to make public opinion known on whether or not passage of
these laws was in line with the people's political interest.74
In addition to these procedural concerns, the court found that in
considering the substance of the deliberations, there was sufficient evidence
from which to infer targeting of African Americans in its deliberations.7 5 It
noted that the district court had acknowledged that one of the stated
purposes of the bill was to move the voter qualification laws "back to the
76
way it was" prior to when the Republicans had control of the legislature.
But rather than allowing this reason to serve as sufficient justification, the
panel went on to explain that this political gamesmanship explicitly targeted
the means to register and vote upon which African Americans most clearly
relied.
The opinion explained that the proffered reasons for the election
law changes particularly the Sunday voting changes-hinged on the
discrepancies in hours and the fact that the counties with more Sunday
voting were predominantly African American.7 ' This led Judge Motz to
conclude that "the State's very justification for a challenged statute hinges
explicitly on race-specifically its concern that African Americans, who had
overwhelmingly voted for Democrats, had too much access to the
franchise." 79
In looking at that pattern, the Fourth Circuit found that there was enough
circumstantial evidence to suggest that several of the Arlington Heights
factors were met.80 The court noted that the radical change in positions
between the efforts regarding voting in the preclearance regime and those
efforts post-Shelby County raised concern. 8 In addition to the enormity and
sweeping nature of the bill, the court looked at commentary in the press
regarding attitudes of political leaders regarding race.82 Notably, the Fourth

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id
Id at 228.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id at 226 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 215-20.
Id. at 229 n.7.
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Circuit quoted at length the comments of Don Yelton, former Republican
Party chair for Buncombe County, North Carolina, where Mr. Yelton
expressed what could be called animus regarding the ability for African
Americans to vote and the need for passage of voter identification laws.83
These circumstances taken as a whole led the Fourth Circuit to find that
there was adequate evidence of discriminatory intent in the passage of the
2013 omnibus voting regulations bill. And the Fourth Circuit criticized the
district court for noting in significant places the fact that there were
disparities regarding access because of socioeconomic factors, but failing to
bring that analysis to bear in finding that there is an inference of
discrimination.

4

The Fourth Circuit also dismissed the government's proffered interest in
preventing fraud and ensuring election integrity. The Fourth Circuit, as
other courts have similarly found, had concluded that there was no actual
evidence on the record of threats to election integrity or substance regarding
the idea of voter fraud, and moreover, there was actual evidence of racial
86
animus, thus distinguishing Crawford v. Marion County from this case.
Moreover, the court analyzed the voter identification requirement as both
over-broad and under restrictive in relation to its proffered goal.
Additionally, the court rejected arguments regarding the legitimacy of
restrictions on early voting and same-day registration because the General
Assembly had rejected the policy-driven advice of the State Board of

83. See Joe Coscarelli, Don Yelton, GOP Precinct Chair, Delivers Most Baldly Racist
Daily
Show
Interview
of All
Time,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Oct.
24,
2013),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/10/don-yelton-racist-daily-show-interview.html.
Mr. Yelton testified before the North Carolina House Rules Committee that the ID requirement
would "disenfranchise some of [Democrats'] special voting blocks [sic]," and that "that within
itself is the reason for the photo voter ID, period, end of discussion." McCrory, 831 F.3d at
229 n.7. The Fourth Circuit also noted that Mr. Yelton said, "If [SL 2013-381] hurts the whites
so be it. If it hurts a bunch of lazy blacks that want to government to give them everything, so
be it." Id
84. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 232 ("In sum, while the district court recognized the
undisputed facts as to the impact of the challenged provisions . . it simply refused to
acknowledge their import."). In particular, this analysis relies on the district court's
acknowledgement of disparate socioeconomic status for African Americans but its dismissal of
this disparate status as having created a vulnerability for such African Americans. I have
argued that this precise kind of political vulnerability, and the discrimination to which it may
lead, ought to be a particular situs of civil rights enforcement. See Atiba R. Ellis, Race, Class,
and StructuralDiscrimination: On Vulnerability Within the PoliticalProcess, 28 J. OF CIVIL
RIGHTS EcON. DEVELOPMENT 33 (2015).
85. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 235-36.
86. Id.at231.
87. Id. at 234-36.
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Elections. Ultimately, the court found that "the challenged provisions in
SL 2013-381 constitute solutions in search of a problem." 89 Accordingly, the
panel struck down the law. 90
IV.

THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF MCCRORY AND POSSIBLE SUPREME

COURT REVIEW

The future of this case remains to be seen. The immediate effect of the
ruling was to enjoin moot the voter identification provision's early voting
provisions and limits on registration provisions for the 2016 election, even
though some argued that the voter suppression nonetheless occurred even
with the Fourth Circuit's injunction in force. 91 This finding survived a
petition for a stay of the injunction because a divided Supreme Court
declined to stay the Fourth Circuit's order prior to the 2016 general
election.92 Thus, at the time of this Article, the appeal of the decision by the
State of North Carolina is currently pending. However, the election of 2016
gave the Democrat Roy Cooper the governorship and Democrat Josh Stein
the office of Attorney General.93 It is conceivable that the Governor and
Attorney General may choose to rescind Governor McCrory's appeal of this
decision.94 While this would conceivably end this litigation, it is also
possible that the Republican-controlled legislature itself may continue the
appeal before the Supreme Court. 95 It is simply unclear at this point whether

the petition for certiorari currently before the Supreme Court will go
forward.

88. Id at 237.
89. Id at 238.
90. To the extent that there was a dissent in the opinion, it revolved around what the
appropriate remedy. The majority of the panel determined that the omnibus voting law ought
to be immediately enjoined. Judges Wynn and Floyd determined that the constitutional
infirmity ought to be remedied immediately because the fact that it had been done with
discriminatory intent made it infirm ab initio. Accordingly, the mandate regarding the law was
put into immediate effect. Judge Motz dissented on the basis that an immediate disablement of
the law would be inappropriate within several months of the actual election.
91. Editorial, Voter Suppression in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/opinion/voter-suppression-in-north-carolina.html?_r=0.
92. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 27 (2016).
93. North
Carolina
2016
Elections,
BALLOTPEDIA
(Nov.
8,
2016),
https://ballotpedia.org/NorthCarolinaAttorneyGeneralelection,_2016.
94. Mark Binker, Cooper Not Tipping Hand on Whether He'll Withdraw NC Voter ID
Appeal, WRALCOM (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.wral.com/cooper-not-tipping-hand-onwhether-he-11-withdraw-nc-voter-id-appeal/ 6495766/.
95. Id
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Nonetheless, this was a clear victory for voting rights advocates during
the 2016 election cycle. And even though this case may or may not be
reconsidered by the Supreme Court, the principles it articulated will give
policymakers and analysts of the law of politics much to consider in the
future. Probably the key idea that will influence voting rights policy going
forward is the Fourth Circuit's analysis of discriminatory intent.
Certainly, the North Carolina legislature left itself open to critique by its
fly-by-night approach to the passage of the omnibus voting bill. The court
made clear its substantial concern for the procedural irregularity that
96
underlies the North Carolina General Assembly's actions. But even more
telling was the court's approach in determining whether race was an
impermissible motivating factor in passage of the law.
This problem has dominated not only the time of the courts but the time
of scholars as well. Of course, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was
designed to offer a broad remedy against racial discrimination in voting. The
end goal, as has been stated by many, has been to eliminate racial bias in the
administration of the voting process (on both a structural and an individual
level). But even from its beginning, Section 2 has been critiqued, as
Christopher Elmendorf has explained, as "utterly opaque, likely to worsen
racial conflict, and probably unconstitutional (because inadequately tethered
to the prevention or remediation of actual constitutional violations)." 97 These
critiques have had the effect of, among other things, squarely raising the
question for scholars and courts as to what, exactly, constitutes
discrimination on the basis of race. 98 Indeed, in Elmendorfs account of
Section 2, the ultimate focus is to ferret out impermissible race-based
decision-making by the majority in a particular jurisdiction. 99
NAACP v. McCrory focuses us on a particular aspect of this problem:
how to determine whether racial discrimination that correlates with party
ambition ought to be actionable under Section 2. This race-or-party dilemma

96. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 214-30.
97. Christopher S. Elmendorf, That Kind of DiscriminationDoes the Voting Rights Act
Target?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 357, 357 (2012) [hereinafter Elmendorf, That Kind
of Discrimination].See also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased
Votes, UnconstitutionalElections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 377 (2012).
98. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Section 2 is Dead: Long Live Section 2, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219 (2012); Elmendorf, Fhat Kind ofDiscrimination,supranote 97, at
377. For more dialogue between Elmendorf, Charles, and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, see Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Response, Justice Kennedy to the Rescue?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
209 (2012), which raises a number of substantial questions about how Section 2 should be
properly understood. These questions take heightened relevance today in light of litigation like
that in McCrory.
99. See Elmendorf, Fhat Kind ofDiscrimination,supra note 97, at 363.
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lies at the heart of the court's reasoning, and, as I will argue, will become a
focal point for future Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
When substantial blocs of voters who are all of the same race end up
almost uniformly voting for the same political party, is it a question of
whether a particular racial intent informed the making of the particular
political choice, or is it that the political choice was the means to effect a
racially motivated end? This dilemma had been forecasted several years
before by scholar Richard Hasen. 00 He helpfully contrasts the period of
backlash against African American voting success in the late 1890s with the
trajectory that this litigation took.' 0' In this comparison, he sketches out how
the framing of the consideration of such a law like North Carolina's voting
qualifications statute as one that is about "party competition" or otherwise
not related to race, the regulation may be given deference.102 But if such a
law is framed as one that is about "race", it will not be given deference.1 03
Hasen argues that this dichotomy fails to take into account the inherent
comingling of race and party given the behavior of voting blocks.1 04 As
such, Hasen argues for an abolition of the dichotomy and instead he
advocates for "an equal protection standard which requires substantial
evidence justifying a burden on voters before a law would be considered
constitutional."

05

While Hasen's solution would have the benefits of desiring substantial
evidence-based justifications for election law changes that disenfranchise, a
concern shared by a number of election law scholars, 0 6 Hasen's solution
falls within the ambit of discouraging discussions about the interrelationship

100. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?:How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolinaand Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58,
58-62 (2014).
101. Id.
102. Id at 61. We have seen such effects, as Hasen has pointed out, in the race-neutral
considerations of voter identification laws under the Crawford v. Marion Co., 553 U.S. 181
(2008), standard under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, A Price Too High:
Efficiencies, Voter Suppression, and the Redefining of Citizenship, 43 Sw. L. REV. 549 (2014)
(describing a deferential utilitarian balancing that prioritizes states interests over generalized
voters' interests in participation).
103. Hasen, supra note 100, at 61.
104. Id at 69.
105. Id at 72.
106. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Invisible Election: Making Policy in a World
Without Data, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013 (2009); JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD (2007); SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING
DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006). See also generally, Atiba
R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 879 (2014) (reviewing the

consequences of detachment from an evidence-based analysis).
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between race and politics in a way that falls within a post-racialism fallacy
by acknowledging the existence of the interrelationship of race and politics
but failing to address it in its own terms due to a desire to frame the terms of
the discussion in race-neutral ways. I explore this in my own work and raise
the concern that this period of the modulation of race-conscious equality has
occurred precisely because we decline to recognize race as a measuring
point for equality particularly political equality in modem society. 0 7 Put
another way, it is the normative aspiration of colorblindness coupled with
the belief that the race-conscious ends of integration and formal equality
have been achieved that is the driver for the current period of retrenchment
by the Court.
The Fourth Circuit's view as illustrated by McCrory is to work within
existing doctrine and explicitly view the existence of racialized voting and
its consequences as a given. It is arguable that the Fourth Circuit's analysis
and its pointer that race and party are inextricably linked is an effort to fix
that analysis by drawing a bright line by which partisans cannot unduly
manipulate the political process given the scope of the effects that that
manipulation might have. By that, I mean the Fourth Circuit seems to be
sending the message that manipulation of particular racial groups in order to
effect a political end can only go so far and with knowledge of that
particular end then one must then be subject to the further regulation
demanded by the Voting Rights Act. Race ought to remain the third rail of
the law of politics.
As we saw in the facts in McCrory, the court was strongly persuaded by
the fact that the general assembly, in analyzing the impact of its proposed
voting changes, asked specifically for evidence regarding African American
voting patterns. By focusing on such voting patterns, the general assembly
was apparently informed that those voting patterns were implicated by the
desire for early voting and the disparate impact on African Americans
regarding voter ID. The Fourth Circuit focused very much on the fact that

107. Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving the Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in the
Post-Civil Rights Era, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REv. 789, 838 (2015). In this piece, I offer an
account of Shelby County that reads the case as a post-racialist narrative that is at odds with the
reality of voter suppression, as McCrory illustrates. See id. at 839-42. While Hasen and other
scholars tend towards a universalist view in part to persuade the Court that has shown disdain
for race-conscious voting rights remedies, see, e.g., Charles, supra note 98, at 226
("Conceptually, I am increasingly attracted to a universal, as opposed to a race-based,
approach to thinking about electoral inequality."), this runs the risk of normalizing racial
hegemony rather than seeking a more nuanced account that locates racial oppression along
with other forms of oppression that are historically grounded and continue to have operative
influence. Indeed, McCrory's focus on race combined with the socioeconomic effects that
make possible the voter suppression at question here illustrate my point.
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with this data in mind, all of the vulnerable areas demonstrated by the report
were areas that the law passed by North Carolina General Assembly focused
on. The Fourth Circuit noticed that North Carolina, "with surgical
precision", changed the law to target African American voting practices.0 8
Thus, when one puts together the notion that race and voting are
inextricably linked and the fact that when it came to voting practices as
analyzed by race, the North Carolina General Assembly focused on African
American voting practices. The underlying policy message is that
legislatures must take significantly greater care when it comes to analyzing
these types of laws and that legislatures implementing these types of laws
had to take such due care is the ultimate thrust of the opinion. This analysis
rejects the race and party dichotomy given the evidence placed on the
record. The case thus illustrates what a lack of due care standard is in
relation to the unavoidable racial components of voting practices. A
knowing disregard of such due care is the ultimate violation of the Voting
Rights Act and of the Fourteenth Amendment. And this kind of disregard
can exist even if an expressly racist attitude is not announced on the record.
This sort of analysis would seem consistent with cases like Gomillion v.
Lightfoot 09 where the practices accompanied with the district's intent and
this notion of lack of due care seemed to dominate what the political process
set out to do. This transitive intent would seem to be problematic, however,
in cases where the proof of motivation is less than clear, even by a
circumstantial measure. This can be seen by comparing McCrory with Fifth
Circuit's recent decision in Veasey v. Abbott."1 0 That case addressed the 2014
Texas voter identification provision passed in the wake of Shelby County."
There, a majority of the Fifth Circuit en banc agreed with the district court
that a disparate impact on the basis of race existed in regards to Texas voting
changes, but this majority fractured in regards to whether discriminatory
intent was findable on the evidence presented.112
The Fifth Circuit majority fractured around the question of whether the
evidence that was presented was actually viable.1"' The majority fractured as
to whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of discriminatory
intent.1 14 A unified dissent of the Fifth Circuit demanded that evidence be

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id at 225 n.1.
Id.
Id.
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more in depth in regards to the Texas voter ID litigation." 5 The various
dissents demanded that there effectively be proof of some sort of agreement
or motivation that ranged towards what would be tantamount to a conspiracy
geared towards disenfranchising African American and Latino voters in
Texas."

6

The Fourth Circuit's opinion does not suffer from such similar
coherence concerns regarding evidentiary standards. More telling is a
comparison of the two premises of the opinion. Obviously, the Fourth
Circuit began from the concept that race and voting were inextricably linked
and that this inextricable linked-ness defined how to view the issues, where
the Fifth Circuit, in contrast, did not agree on this beginning premise.
Indeed, some judges took this as a beginning but the dissent vociferously
argued that the danger of accusing government entities of acting on the basis
of race in violation of the constitution was highly dangerous and violated
democratic norms." 7 This type of analysis would eviscerate the ability for
courts to mediate claims regarding race, which in and of itself would be
quite problematic. Thus the Fifth Circuit's precedent would seem to reveal
the tension between notions of colorblind jurisprudence and notions of
carrying out the Fifteenth Amendment's command to prevent discrimination
on the basis of race.
It is difficult (or impossible) to analyze discrimination on the basis of
race if such claims are so dangerous that they should not be made lightly and
if moreover that such claims ought to and can only be brought if there is
open and outright proof of a conspiracy to discriminate on the basis of race.
The problem then with the dissenting Fifth Circuit opinions is that it raises
the standard too high for bringing such claims. In contrast, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion on the exact same type of issue and its beginning premise
would seem to be in line with where current reality (and the law) regarding
race and democracy is. For example, the Supreme Court had recently in
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama"8 reiterated that the Shaw v.
Reno1 9 line of cases that subject heightened scrutiny to changes regarding
electoral districts made solely on the basis of race was still a viable line of

115. Id. at 280.
116. Id. at 281 (Jones, J. dissenting) (by allowing the discriminatory intent claim to go
forward, "the majority fans the flames of perniciously irresponsible racial name-calling"); Id.
at 325 (Clement, J., dissenting) ("The plurality also overlooks the total absence of direct
evidence of a discriminatory purpose and the effect of plaintiffs' failure to unearth such
evidence-despite repeated assertions that such evidence exists.").
117. See text accompanying n. 116.
118. 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
119. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/2

18

Ellis: When Political Domination Becomes Racial Discrimination: NAACP v.
2017]

THE INEXTRICABLE PROBLEM OF RACE IN POLITICS

535

precedent.120 This would suggest that the heightened scrutiny where race is
effected is still viable. Moreover, against this context, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and its underlying doctrine would also seem to be in
effect-at least until the next iteration of the Roberts Court considers these
issues.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given all of these principles, then, the Fourth Circuit's decision in
McCrory is in line with the ultimate intent of Voting Rights Act
jurisprudence. It is fair to say, however, that there are those parties who
think that even this jurisprudence is out of line and does more damage to the
law than good for the law. As I have discussed above, commentators have
critiqued the entire enterprise of using race conscious remedies in order to
effect change in regard of the law of politics.
Certainly a number of voices on the Court who have until this point
been in the minority have sought to limit voting rights jurisprudence to open
an outright denials of the right to vote and not to claims which, by their
disparate impact, would serve to abridge the right to vote or premise denials
based on disparate impact.121 Others have argued that in light of Crawford v.

120. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1260.
121. This is to say that a majority of the Court has consistently ruled to constrain the
scope of congressional authority under the Voting Rights Act, but at least two justices have
openly argued in the recent past that such constraint does not go far enough. This is clearly
illustrated in Shelby County. Chief Justice Roberts, in striking down Section 4(b) of the Act,
premised this action on the view that congressional action regarding the coverage formula had
failed to calibrate the coverage of Section 5 for current needs for voting rights enforcement,
thus refuting Congress's judgment that the full scope of Section 5 was necessary. See Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) ("Congress could have updated the coverage
formula [in 2009], but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to
declare [Section] 4(b) unconstitutional."). This minimalist position in and of itself disrupted
Congress's power in legislating around voting rights as described above in this Article.
However, in concurring with this judgment, Justice Thomas offered a broader rejection of the
Voting Rights Act. He argued that by merely limiting this finding to the constitutionality of the
coverage formula, the Court had avoided ruling on what he views as the need to find Section 5
unconstitutional. See id. at 2631 (Thomas, J. concurring). See also Northwest Austin
Municipal Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Moreover, Justice Thomas's longstanding view that the Voting Rights Act as currently
interpreted is unconstitutional reaches beyond the scope of Section 2. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall,
512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (joined by Scalia, J.). As I argue below, it
is foreseeable that this view could receive a majority of votes from the Court.
Compare this with the view of Justice Ginsberg (joined by Justices Souter, Kagan, and
Sotomayor) that heightened voting rights regulation by the federal government is needed to
thwart state-level efforts at voter suppression. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2633
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Moreover, she argued that this was well within the authority granted
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Marion County,122 that provisions regarding heightened regulations ought to

be subject to the equivalent of purely rational basis treatment, and because of
that use of regulations like the Voting Rights Act tend to stymie the ability
for protecting election integrity.123
This view-that election integrity is endangered by race-conscious
rules-is specious. It is as specious as the existence of evidence of dangers
to election integrity based on non-existent voter fraud. They serve to
misdirect our concern from actual threats to election integrity including
problems of voter registration, problems with election administration
regulation and the problems that come from interference by parties outside
of the American political community. But as this Article has acknowledged,
the former concern about the underlying policy regarding race conscious
election law remedies is currently an open question that awaits a ninth
Justice to resolve it for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, the decision in McCrory, in and of itself, is a product of the tied
Supreme Court's inability to resolve deeply divisive issues due to its lack of
a ninth Justice. However, with the election of Donald J. Trump as President
of the United States and the Senate continuing to be controlled by the
Republican Party, a Justice of Scalia's ilk will likely be appointed as the next
Associate Justice of the United States. This reconstituted Roberts Court may
well be disposed to being skeptical of the use of race conscious remedies in
election law and thus McCrory, if it is appealed and argued before the
Supreme Court on its merits, or similar cases, may end up being delimited in
a way that would tend to be more conservative. What is more likely is that
Veasey v. Abbott, once it's resolved and right for merits adjudication by a
newly constituted Supreme Court, will delimit this analysis regarding
intentional discrimination in election law.
However, there is a plausible theory for a different approach given that
Justice Kennedy and the liberal justices did agree in other cases regarding
race conscious remedies that the law should be treated as correct in regards
to affirmative action and that considerations for reversing such law ought not
to prevail. Thus, there is the potential that the five justice majority that
coalesced in Fisher too may very well see that the same sort of rationale

to Congress by the Fifteenth Amendment, and thus to strike down Section 4(b), and thus
nullify Section 5, was beyond the scope of the Court. Id. at 2636-39.
122. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
123. Justice Scalia doined by Justices Thomas and Alito) in Crawfordargued that under
the Fourteenth Amendment, voting regulations that do not significantly increase the burden of
voting should be presumed to be constitutional, suggesting a rational basis level of deference
to such regulations. See id at 209 (Scalia, J. concurring).
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ought to apply in race conscious law of democracy cases.124 Thus, the only
way that a ruling like McCrory would continue to stand is if the law it is
based on is deemed well settled and as a modest extension of Arlington
Heights within the Section 2 context. It would then be up to litigators
arguing this case before the Court and arguing future cases like it to find this
zone of settled law as a means by which to determine what arguments would
persuade Justice Kennedy and ensure that he, along with the liberal justices,
would uphold a decision in this regard.125
The reality is that short of the Governor of North Carolina withdrawing
the case, the risk of reversal of McCrory remains high. This opinion may
very well be remembered as the high water mark of an interregnum created
by the deadlock of the Supreme Court lacking a functional majority. History
may reveal that a decision like McCrory may ultimately be an aberration in
the otherwise conservative approach that courts tend to take in imputing bad
legislative intent to brace conscious action. On the other hand, the decision
may ultimately serve as a roadmap in terms of how to find and combat such
legislative intent in election law.
At the end, I remain an optimist. If the notion of heightened concern in
regards to race as informed by the enduring existence of racialized
socioeconomic disadvantage as articulated in McCrory takes purchase, it
will give legislatures and judges everywhere that are considering electoral
systems or other policies that have a racial component great pause in
considering how to go forward with those changes. Such policymakers will
have to balance the political motivations with the concern for not running
afoul of the constitution in regards to its race conscious rules regarding
election law. In an increasingly diversifying America where today's majority
will not last for longer than this generation, the need for attention to this
concern is becoming more and more necessary.

124. See Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), where a five-justice
majority in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by the liberal justices
upheld race-conscious affirmative action policies in higher education against Fourteenth
Amendment challenge.
125. Cf Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 98 (arguing that the ultimate course of Section 2
jurisprudence will rely on shaping arguments that would appeal to Justice Kennedy as the
"swing" justice of the Court).
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